ESC BRIEFING

4 March 1957

WE POSITION IN ARABIA

- I. We position of control, both in various Arab principalities along the Persian Gulf coast and in Aden Protectorate area, at foot of Arabian Peninsula--areas which are vital to Britain and important to all Vestera oil interests--is increasingly threatened by scrious unrest.
 - A. Britain's special position is backward Gulf states rests historically on treation with local rulers which code control of defense and foreign relations to the UK.
 - B. Such treaty rights are particularly vulnerable to present hostile wave of Arab nationalism.
 - C. For present, British apparently intend to refrain from policy immovations toward Gulf territories, for fear of deepening local Arab suspicion of UK intentions.
 - 1. However, top leadership in London (including Labor party)
 has displayed determination to hang on in Persian Gulf.
 - 3. British are presumably willing to use force, if necessary.
- II. Considering principalities in electrise order, can start at

 Kuvait, at head of Persian Gulf-this Sultanete claims world's

 largest proved oil reserves and formerly furnishing UK with

 ever 60% of its crude oil imports.

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- B. Emmitti mationalist groups are even more hostile to UE since Sues adventure. Sationalists are gaining support for idea that immensely rich ruler of Eurait is moving too slowly with political reform.
 - Egyptian influence in Entrit is increasing especially in the schools.
 - 2. UE official influence is weakening: British advisors are being dismissed, while the Sultan and his heachson have become almost inaccessible to those UE officials remaining.
- C. The SS commul in Emmit has reported his opinion that if worst comes to werst, the British are going to have to think about hanging on in Euwait by force.
- III. Next in order, the island Sheikhdom of Sahrein and the peninsular Sheikhdom of Qatar, are also seemes of increasing nationalist unrest. Both areas are important petroleum sites.
 - A. At the important refinery center of Bahrein, Egyptian influence on public opinion seems especially strong.
 - 8. In Gatar, situation is complicated by a context for popular support between rivals for succession to the throne. The Gatar ruler, himself, is believed involved in local Egyptian activities against the British.
- IV. The next special segment of Arabian coast, the seven so-called "trucial sheighdows", are "protected" and administered by the UK Foreign Office's "Persian Gulf Residency". Little information is available on local conditions in these backward and thusfar eil-poor principalities.

- v. The next major British sphere of influence is the extension Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. Egyptian memistance to refugee tribesmen from interior Comm suggests that Cairo is trying to step up agitation and subversion against this major BE ally.
 - A. In late '55, the Sultan's forces (British-led and Britishsupported) pushed into the interior and custed the Saudis from the Burnimi Casis. The Sultan's troops also reasserted control over the Imamate of Immer Conn-whose ruler did not recognize the Sultan's authority and had become a protose of the Saudi throne.

a.	Count !	refuges	are	101	poing	brough	t from	Saudi	Arabia	to
	Calso.	They w	ay be	rac	eiving	arms	and fe	dayees	-type	
	traini	training from the Egyptians.								

- VI. Finally, the situation in Britain's Aden Protectorate, at the southwest corner of Arabia, is already serious.
 - A. Yemen, which is receiving arms and other assistance from the Soviet bloc, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria, is pushing a growing campaign of ambushes, raids and terror along the extensive Protectorate border. The Yemeni actions are aimed at subverting restless tribesmen and intimidating protectorate rulers in treaty relations with the UK.
 - B. Since the Imam of Yemen claims all of Adem Protectorate and Colony as his own territory, he is not interested in a more settlement of disputed frontiers.

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